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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant 
to Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in that timely filing 
of the Notice of Appeal was made on August 24, 1992 within 9 days 
of the final Judgement of Contempt entered on July 23, 19r ani 
from the Order and Judgement Regarding Attorney's Fees en re on 
August 12, 1992 in the Third Judicial District Court in -d or 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah (See Salzetti v. Backman, 638 P.2d 
543-544 at 1. Contempt, and cases cited therein.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented by the appeal are whether or not: 
1) The trial court finding that mitigating circumstances, 
potentially provoking the actions causing the contempt, were not 
relevant to a contempt proceeding and ruling on that basis to exclude 
such evidence was in error* The standard of review is reversal of 
error in accordance with the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Rule 22, Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103, and Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, Appendix D - Uniform Misdemeanor Fine/Bail Schedule; 
2) Assistance of counsel for BULLOCK (the defendant/appellant) 
during the court's hearing and review was ineffective and deficient 
to the extent that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" 
guaranteed a defendant by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and, second, that such deficiency or ineffectiveness 
prejudiced the defense so as to deprive BULLOCK of a fair trial. 
The standard of review is the failure of counsel to satisfy the 
requirements Sec, 78-51-26 Utah Judicial Code and Rules 1.1 and 1.3 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Part II, Chapter 13. 
Issues also subordinate to counsel's assistance are: 
2(a) Attorney's fees awarded to TOYOTA, plaint iff/appellee, 
(BULLOCK's counsel failing to present rebuttal reserved at trial) 
lacked sufficient basis for court's finding of fact and judgement. 
The Standard of review is sufficiency of basis for finding of fact 
pursuant to Rule 201 Utah Rules of Evidence and Rule 4-505 Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration. 
2(b) The court had jurisdiction if BULLOCK was not served 
adequate notice on Order to Show Cause. The standard of review 
is insufficiency of service on BULLOCK of the Order to Show Cause 
pursuant to Rule 6(d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Judicial Code Annotated: 
1) 78-32-10. Contempt - Action by Court. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Attorney's fees. 
There is no provision for an additional penalty of 
attorney's fees for contempt. Mellor v. Cook, 597 P.2d 882 
2) 78-32-11. Damages to party agrieved. 
3) 78-51-26. Duties of attorneys and counselors. 
It is the duty of an attorney and counselor: 
(1) to support the Constitution and the laws of the 
United States and of this state; 
(2) to maintain the respect due to the courts of 
justice and judicial officers; 
(3) to counsel or maintain no other action, proceeding 
or defense than that which appears to him to be legal and 
just, excepting the defense of a person charged with a 
(4) to employ for the purposes of maintaining the causes 
confided to him such means only as are consistent with 
truth and never to seek to mislead the judges by any 
artifice or false statement of fact or law; 
(5) to maintain inviolate the confidences, and at every 
peril to himself to preserve the secrets of his client; 
(6) to abstain from all offensive personality, and to 
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation 
of a witness, unless required by the justice of the cause 
with which he is charged; 
(7) not to encourage either the commencement or 
continuance of an action or proceeding from any corrupt 
motive or passion or interest; 
(8) never to reject for any consideration personal to 
himself the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed; and 
(9) to comply with all duly approved rules and regulations 
prescribed by the board of commissioners of the Utah State 
Bar and to pay the fees provided by law. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
... 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation, 6 ALR 4th 16 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration: 
1) Part II, Chapter 13, Rules of Professional Conduct; 
Rule 1.1. Competence. 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation 
to a client. Competent representation requires the 
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation. 
Rule 1.3 Diligence. 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client. 
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2) Ri * ' ~ A** ^ ---*-( 
(1) Affidavits in support of an awaru *^ c*v^ 
fees must be filed with the court and set forth 
specifically ,•» the number of hours spen! for 
which a11ornej '" s fees are c 1 aimed » » • 
(4) Judgement's 1 or attorney's 1 ees should " "M-
awarded except as they conform t o the pi ovi s* . 
this rule .•• 
^, Appendix Uniform Misdemeanoi F i n e / B a " 1 <?~***H«i« 
A;s : 
The enhancement or reductions to the basic fine should 
reflect the severity of the offense, the extent of victim 
injury or property damage loss, the risk which offender 
proposes to society, the offender's criminal and personal 
history, and related factors. (Specific aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances are set forth below.) 
Aggi a ¥ a I i ug and M i t i fed I i ip, 
M i i i g Jin I in iiinK <" i r o u r n s t a n r e s , 
( 1 ) O f f e n d e r ' s ti" i iujuiJ c o n d u c t n e i t h e r caused 
iior t h r e a t e n e d s e r i o u s harm. 
( 2 ) O f f e n d e r a c t e d under ,'I rong pr l i n n . 
IJ t ah K u I OH ill' Cr i mi I IH I : 
I judgement and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilt} 
or plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for 
imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor 
more than 30 days after the verdict or plea, unless the 
court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise 
orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the 
defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing the sentence the court shall afford 
the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his 
own behalf and to present any information in mitigation 
of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence 
should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall 
also be given an opportunity to present any information 
material to the imposition of sentence. 
i I'ul vt, -if (j v i I1,' j» " i P u i' I 
I? ii I F '" T\ p IP 
other than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of 
the hearing thereof shall be served not later than 5 days 
before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different 
period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such 
an order may for cause shown be made on ex parte application. 
When a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall 
be served with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided 
in rule 59(c) opposing affidavits may be served not later than 
1 day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be 
served at some other time. 
Utah Rules of Evidence: 
1) Rule 103. Rulings on Evidence. 
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence 
unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting 
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears 
of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if 
the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one 
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was 
made known to the court by offer or was apparent from 
the context within which questions were asked. 
2) Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice 
of adjudicative facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one 
not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) 
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination 
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon 
timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the 
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the 
matter noticed. In the absense of prior notification, the 
request may be made after judicial notice has been taken. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Kinds of facts. 
Bookkeeping methods. 
It is common knowledge in Utah that in the early history of 
irrigation corporations the books and records were not always 
kept according to rules of bookkeeping, and that proceedings 
of officers and directors were not always fully and correctly 
recorded. Nash v. Alpine Irrigation Co., 58 Utah 84, 197 P 704 
(1922). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature 
The case is one of contempt where BULLOCK was found guilty 
of violating a court order restraining him from telephoning the 
employees of TOYOTA (his estranged spouse's employer), jailed 
forthwith for three days, fined $500,00, and held liable for 
fees of TOYOTA'S counsel in the amount of $2,445.50. 
BULLOCK's counsel appealed to this Court then, during the 
course of the appeal - as a result of being disbarred, withdrew 
as counsel. 
BULLOCK, acting pro se, determined that the basis for the 
original appeal as filed by his counsel lacked merit but continues 
the appeal claiming 1) he has been provided ineffective counsel at 
at the trial court level, and 2) there is apparent commission of 
reversible error at the trial court level. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On February 6, 1992 the Plaintiff, Toyota of Ogden, a Utah 
Corporation brought a verified complaint to the trial Court 
alleging BULLOCK had engaged in a plan to injure and damage 
employee relationships of TOYOTA through engaging in repetitive 
harassing telephone calls to the officers, employees, and family 
members at their place of work and residences. TOYOTA sought a 
temporary restraining order prohibiting the defendant from making 
such calls, issuance of a preliminary injunction enjoining BULLOCK 
from making such calls, an award of compensatory damages proved at 
trial, and an award of $50,000 in punitive damages. 
A temporary restraining order and summons to answer complaint 
were served on BULLOCK on February 7, 1992. On February 12, 1992 
BULLOCK answered the complaint that, in part, his actions had been 
an exercise of proper marital care and concern for his estranged 
spouse in a dangerous and life threatening situation conce ning use 
of alcohol and illicit drugs on the work premises of TOYO^ , and 
that TOYOTA's response to BULLOCK's written letter of Jar *ry 20, 
1992 to plaintiff's Chief Executive Officer, Tony Divin were 
proximate cause for BULLOCK's actions. After coming beiore the 
court on February 13, 1992, the granting of TOYOTA's motion for 
preliminary injunction enjoining BULLOCK from contacting TOYOTA'S 
employees was ordered on February 25, 1992. 
On June 26, 1992 TOYOTA moved the trial court for an order 
requiring BULLOCK to appear and show cause why BULLOCK should 
not be held in contempt of court, and on June 29, 1992 an Order to 
Show Cause was served upon BULLOCK requiring him to appear before 
the court on July 6, 1992. 
On July 2, 1992 BULLOCK retained Ray S. Stoddard as counsel 
and provided to him a copy of the Order to Show Cause and a tape 
recording of two messages left on BULLOCK's answering machine on 
June 29, 1992. 
At court on July 6, 1992, BULLOCK's counsel raised two 
objections to the court's jurisdiction in the proceeding based on 
the adequacy of notice with regard to the time allowed to respond 
and documents accompanying the Order to Show Cause. BULLOCK's 
counsel requested a two week continuation in that he, because of 
the July 4th holiday, had not even had the court open a full day 
so as to allow his review of court records. TOYOTA's counsel 
noted "I don't believe that there is anything in the rules that 
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requires anything to be supported by the Order to Show Cause and 
be served upon the opposing party. There is nothing in the rules 
specifically." (See July 6 transcript, pg3/21-25). 
The court granted a continuation to the following day, July 7, 
1992, and noted that the original Order to Show Cause "doesn't have 
an affidavit with it." (See July 6 transcript, pglO/3-4). 
At court on July 7, 1992, BULLOCK's counsel renewed his motion 
that the court lacked jurisdiction and noted he had not "actually 
seen the (court's) file." (See July 7 transcript, pg4/8-9). 
TOYOTA's counsel presented the court a Notice of Continuance 
delivered to BULLOCK's counsel the night before maintaining it 
"essentially contains all of the pleadings and all of the documents 
in the court's file." (See July 7 transcript, pgl/19-22). TOYOTA's 
counsel noted he had to "correct myself in indicating to the Court 
that I was not aware of a rule requiring service of an affidavit 
withan Order to Show Cause. Rule 6 clearly requires that certain 
Orders to Show Cause be accompanied by an affidavit." (See July 7 
transcript pg2/l-6). 
The Notice of Continuance delivered the night before to 
BULLOCK's counsel contained a Constable's Return of Service showing 
service on June 29, 1992 of only an ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. TOYOTA's 
counsel then presented to the court an original Constable's Amended 
Return of Service showing service on June 29, 1992 of an ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE & MOTION & AFFIDAVIT & MEMORANDUM. BULLOCK's counsel 
did not challenge the presentation of the Amended Return of Service 
even when the court queried, "Why is there an Amended Constable's 
Return." (See July 7 transcript pg3/7-8). 
TOYOTA'S counsel presented to the court an affidavit as a 
proffer to what attorney's fees would be if awarded by the court. 
BULLOCK's counsel reserved the right to reopen and challenge the 
affidavit and proffer after noting that he did not think TOYOTA 
was entitled to attorney's fees. Later BULLOCK's counsel noted 
"As to attorney's fees. I do have a lack of preparation time. I 
can cite in the annotations to 78-32-10, under attorney fees it 
says, 'There is no provisions for additional penalty of attorney's 
fees for a contempt.' Miller vs. Coke (sic), 597 Pac2d 882. I did 
not have time to read that case. I would like, before the Court 
decides on the attorney's fees, I would like an opportunity to 
read that ." (See July 7 transcript pg39/23-25, pg40/l-5). 
BULLOCK's counsel attempted to show that there were mitigating 
circumstances in that employees of TOYOTA had harrassed, provoked, 
and goated BULLOCK into violation of the Restraining Order noting 
BULLOCK "did himself record two messages that ... indicate what the 
kind of abuse he has been subjected to and I will ask at this point 
does the Court want to hear testimony in mitigation of what has 
happened and what he has been subjected to? I think it is relevant 
at this point" to which the court responded, "In all due respect, 
Mr. Stoddard, I don't think mitigating circumstances are relevant to 
this kind of proceeding. There is a Court Order in place and the 
only issues are whether he knew of the Court Order, whether he had 
the ability to comply with it, whether he reasonably and knowingly 
failed to or refused to comply with it. And those are the relevant 
issues and I don't think mitigation is relevant." (See July 7 
transcript pg37/16-25, pg38/l-20). 
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C. Disposition by Third District Court 
The court found that there had veen a violation of the Court 
Order in the case and, at the trial on July 7, 1991, imposed a 
fine of $50.00 for each of the 10 phone calls made on June 27, 
1992, ordered BULLOCK to serve 3 days in jail commitment issuing 
forthwith, awarded costs to be paid by BULLOCK to TOYOTA, and 
took under advisement with regard to awarding attorney's fees. 
In a July 23, 1992 Memorandum Decision the court imposed a 
fine of $50.00 per phone call for each of the 10 phone calls made 
June 27, 1992, a jail sentence of five days, and awarded costs 
and attorney's fees totaling $2,445.50 to be paid by BULLOCK to 
TOYOTA within 20 days of the date of the ruling. 
BULLOCK's counsel made no subsequent attempt, after trial, 
to challenge or offer contrary evidencce to the amount of awarded 
attorney's fees as had been his stated and reserved intent at 
trial. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Issue 1: 
The contempt charge was a criminal procedure, and, pursuant 
to Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Appendix D, UCJA, 
the trial judge may have erred in ruling that BULLOCK's testimony 
and offered evidence were irrelevant and inadmissable regarding the 
mitigating circumstances surrounding the contemnor's actions. 
Isuue 2: 
Rules 1.1 and 1.3, Part II, Chapter 13, UCJR and 78-51-26 UJC 
require counsel to maintain the competence, including thoroughness 
and preparation, and diligence to adequately represent a client. 
The failure of BULLOCK's counsel to 1) review the court files 
prior to trial, 2) review case laws critical to the defense, 
3) challenge TOYOTA's counsel's presentation of clearly suspect 
evidence (or move to have same stricken), and, 4) fail to offer 
rebuttal (after reserving the intent to do so during trial) >f 
the reasonableness of attorney's fees as submitted by TOYOT has 
clearly left BULLOCK with an inadequate representation pre dcial 
to the court's review, findings, and judgements in the ca ,. 
Issue 2(a): 
BULLOCK's counsel reserved at trial his intent to review and 
respond to, first, the court's authority for awarding and, second, 
the reasonableness of the submitted attorney's fees. Through an 
apparent lack of diligence BULLOCK's counsel failed to make a 
timely response to either the court's authority for awarding or 
the reasonablness of noted fees, except to use the issue of the 
court's authority to award as basis for the appeal at Bar. 
It is the contention of BULLOCK - serving now pro se as his 
own counsel after withdrawl of Ray Stoddard as counsel - that: 
1) authority to award attorney's fees is justified by law and 
and precedent in this action and that prior counsel's filing of 
this appeal on that basis lacked merit; 
2) court's finding that TOYOTA'S attorney's fees were reasonable, 
without contrary evidence presented, was exercise of adjudicative 
notice pursuant to rule 201 URE and finding lacked basis, prima 
facie, in that the affidavit TOYOTA's counsel submitted was not 
pursuant to Rule 4-505 Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
Issue 2(b): 
BULLOCK's counselor failed to object to or move to strike 
court's admission of an Amended Return of Service which cleared 
for the court a jurisdictional question that had been raised. 
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at that time BULLOCK*s counselor had available an original 
Return of Service contradicting the admitted one and giving 
support to the premise that the court lacked jurisdiction. 
Because BULLOCK's counselor had been denied a continuance for a 
reasonable amount of time to prepare for the case, this failure was 
critical in that an evidentiary hearing to determine what had in fact 
been served on the defendant would have allowed the time necessary for 
adequate preparation of the case. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue 1: 
Though the matter before the court is a civil proceeding, 
the contempt charge was a criminal procedure in that it resulted 
in a penalty for contempt that included commitment to jail and 
fine, "solely and simply to vindicate the authority of the court 
or to punish otherwise for conduct offensive to the public in 
violation of an order of the court. Thus, where the object of a 
contempt proceeding is to vindicate the dignity or authority of 
the court, it is criminal in character even though it arises 
from, or is ancillary to a civil action ... when the defendant 
is incarcerated for a definite period of time for having failed 
to obey a court order, the contempt is criminal. Similarly, when 
the contemnor is required to pay a fine for having disobeyed a 
a court order, the contempt is criminal." (See Am Jur 2d, 374). 
In Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 at [5] "Contempt order 
is 'criminal' if fine or sentence is fixed and unconditional, 
but is 'civil1 if fine or imprisonment is conditional such that 
contemnor can obtain relief from contempt order merely by doing 
some act as ordered by the court." 
The trial judge attested to her belief that the procedure 
was civil contempt as can be seen from the transcript of the 
proceedings on July 6, 1992 at page 6, lines 1-5. 
Whether civil or criminal the court should follow some rules 
of procedure even given the latitude judges have in matters 
contempt of court. 
In State v. Lush, 95 N.W.2d 695, at [41 "Contempt being 
without any particular form of action, is not subject to the 
limitations of procedure prescribed for the conduct of either civil 
or criminal actions. See State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, supra. 
However, we have often said that a prosecution for criminal contempt 
is governed by, and to be conducted in accordance with, the strict 
rules applicable in criminal prosecutions." 
Presuming that the Utah Criminal Rules of Procedure ought to 
be followed in criminal contempt hearings, then the exclusion of 
testimony and evidence as not relevant before sentencing, when 
purporting to demonstrate mitigating circumstances, is reversible 
error in accordance with Rule 103(a)(2) of the U.R.E. 
In Osmus v. Osmus, 198 P.2d 233, 235 (the only referrence found 
in a computer word search of Utah cases using "contempt, mitigation, 
and punishment") Justice Wolfe comments at [2,3], "The fact that 
plaintiff received $5,000 for the equity in the home did not excuse 
the defendant from complying with the order of the court. The 
existence of independent means might be a factor to be considered 
by the court in fixing alimony, or in considering a petition for 
modification of a decree, or perhaps, under certain circumstances, 
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in initiation for punishment of contempt." (Emphasis added) 
In Utah the issue begs determination. Across the nation, 
however, there does exist precedent. In Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 
173 P.2d 173, at 3. "Divorce In contempt proceeding ancillary 
to divorce action, court erred in imposing jail sentence on 
husband, for violating order barring him from his home pending 
divorce action, without permitting husband to introduce evidence 
that before he attempted to force his way into his house he saw 
his wife and another man under circumstances which would have 
tended to excuse his violation of order, or would at least have 
tended to mitigate the offense." In Justice Robinson's opinion, 
Supreme Court of Washington, "We think that appellant was entitled 
at the very least, to submit the offered evidence to the effect 
that he saw through a window a man, partially disrobed, on a bed 
with his wife, before he attempted to force his way into the house 
in violation of the injunctive order. An outright killing, under 
such circumstances is frequently held to be justifiable homicide, 
or perhaps more often, merely manslaughter. Surely, such evidence 
would have tended to excuse the violation of a routine order 
barring him from his home, or would have at least tended to 
mitigate the offense, if any. Of course, the offered evidence 
may be wholly fictitious, but it was material. 
The judgement and sentence appealed from is reversed, and the 
cause remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary and 
appropriate. 
BEALS, C. J., and MILLARD, and JEFFERS, JJ., concur." 
Though BULLOCK's counsel appears, perhaps, ineffective in his 
representation at the many points noted herein, at least in his 
attempt to have the court admit testimony and evidence pertaining 
to mitigating circumstances relevant to BULLOCK's sentencing he 
was persistent. (See July 7 transcript pgl9/20-25, pg20/20-25. 
pg27/10-25, pg37/16-25, pg38/2-38, & pg39/l-ll). On the basi of 
relevancy to a civil contempt hearing the court excluded ter mony 
and offered evidence. (See July 7 transcript at same refer ices). 
Issue 2: 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 at 
[5] Criminal Law., "A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's 
assistance was so defective as to require reversal ... has two 
components: first, defendant must show that counsel's performance 
was deficient, requiring showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 
guaranteed by the Sixth Ammendment and, Second, defendant must 
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense by 
showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." 
BULLOCK's counsel, during trial, mentioned or demonstrated 
on several occassions he was not prepared (had not had the time 
to prepare) for hearing of the case. (See July 6 transcript at 
pg2/20-25, pg3/l-4&18-19,
 Pg5/22-25 and on July 7 at pg21/8-ll*, 
pg39/23-25, pg40/9-10*). He reserved on two of those occasions 
(noted as * above) that he wished to reserve for later comment the 
appropriateness as to the award of and amount of the attorney's 
fees TOYOTA sought to recover. At no time did BULLOCK's counsel 
communicate with BULLOCK, either in written or oral fashion, as 
to what was transpiring in this case regarding those fees. From 
the day the notice of appeal was filed (August 24, 1992) until 
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some five month's after counsel's withdrawl of representation 
(April 9, 1993), only once did counsel communicate with BULLOCK 
and that was to request $200 for preparation of a brief (in March 
of 1993). Counsel's failure to respond to TOYOTA's counsel's 
communications, the memorandum decision of the trial court, or to 
keep BULLOCK informed demonstrates an ineffectiveness, if not a 
total disregard, of representation. [See issue (2a) herein] 
In State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027 at [3] "... We conclude 
that the failure of defendant's trial counsel to object to the 
prosecutor's comment to the jury regarding Stewart's invocation of 
her testimonial deprived defendant of effective assistance of 
counsel. The two-part test adopted by the United States Supreme 
Court in Strickland v. Washington ... and employed in this court 
in our cases, 805 P.2d 182 ... has been met. No sound course of 
trial strategy could dictate defense counsel to be silent at such 
a crucial time." 
BULLOCK's counsel, in an attempt to secure a period of time 
during which a strategy for the defense could be developed, made 
several references to the court's lack of jurisdiction due to an 
insufficiency of service (See July 6 transcript at pgl,2,3,5,6,7,^8 
and July 7 transcript at pgl,2,3,&4) in that BULLOCK had not been 
served an adequate Order to Show Cause with accompanting n affidavit. 
When TOYOTA's counsel presented an Amended Return of Service 
as proof of adequate service, even though BULLOCK's counsel had 
at his disposal a copy of the original Return of service that 
countered the presentation (see both returns in the Addendum), 
counsel did not object. When the judge asked TOYOTA's counsel 
whv is there an Amended Constable's Return?", and TOYOTA's counsel 
evaded admitting that the original supported BULLOCK's contention 
that an affidavit had not accompanied the service (see July 7 
transcript at pg3/7-13). BULLOCK's counsel did not move to strike. 
In order to secure the time to develop a strategy f th 
defense this was a critical juncture. [See issue 2(b) ?jreir|« 
In Garrett v. Osborn (See 431 p.2d 1012) where ju igeir t was 
reversed and case remanded at 1. New Trial, "Attorney who at no 
time during trial, pretrial conference, or other hearings offered 
any argument or discussion explaining issues, and who neither 
filed required briefs nor adequately explained his failure to file 
briefs, and client was entitled to new trial. 
2. Evidence In determining whether litigant was entitled to 
new trial on ground of inadequate counsel representation, court 
could take judicial notice of fact that for reasons other than 
conduct involved in present case, litigant's trial attorney had 
been disbarred." (Emphasis added) 
3. New Trial Incompetence or neglect of counsel, under 
some circumstances, will entitle litigant to a new trial." 
(See also Jennings v. Stoker, Utah, 652 P.2d 912, and Malby v. 
Cox Construction Co., Utah, 598 P.2d 336 (1979) in Chief Justice 
Crockett's opinion which is concurred in by two other justices). 
Issue 2(a): 
BULLOCK's counsel reserved at trial (See July 7 transcript 
pg20/17-25, pg21/l-14, pg39/23-25, and pg40/l-18) his intent to 
review and respond to both the court's authority to award and, then 
as well, the reasonableness of TOYOTA's attorney's fees. Through 
an apparent lack of diligence BULLOCK's counsel did neither. 
In the court's July 23, 1993 memorandum decision the court 
uses, cited by TOYOTA, Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528,(1981), 
and also, as additional basis for the finding, the cases of B&R 
Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 503 P2.d 1216 (Utah 1972) and Davidson 
v. Munsey, 80 P. 743 (1905) to find the award of attorney's fees 
under the "costs and expenses" provision of Section 78-32-11 and 
supplemental affidavit submitted by TOYOTA'S counsel pursuant to 
Rule 4-505 UCJA as reasonable and appropriate. 
The court cites, contra, Mellor v. Cook, 597 P.2d 882, (1979). 
In Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528, Justice Oaks' opinion, 
with concurrence of three other justices, finds at [8] "Appellant 
challenges the propriety of the trial court's award of attorney's 
fees for work after the 1973 judgement, including the appeal to 
this Court and the contempt and other proceedings to enforce 
appellant's contractual obligations and the orders of the court. 
We find no error in this award. The court's award of attorney's 
fees ... was justified under the original contract provisions 
obligating appellant to pay ... including counsel fees, or under 
the 'costs and expenses' provision of 78-31-11". 
Justice Oaks cites the two other above noted cases that, in 
this case, trial court Judge Anne M. Stirba cites as suppportive 
to her findings. 
In B & R Supply v. Bringhurst, 503 P.2d 1216, Justice Crockett, 
with the concurrence of the three other juutices, notes at [1] "It is 
well established in our law that attorney's fees cannot be recovered 
unless provided for by statute or by law." The remainder of the 
opinion address whether by contract such attorney's fees should be 
awarded and determines that some, invoices signed by Leo Bringhurst, 
were allowable and some, those signed by his agent, were not. The 
court's use as basis in this case to support it's finding appears 
immaterial in that the case addresses neither contempt nor 
provisions of Section 78-32-11. 
In Davidson v. Munsey, 80 P. 743, in an appeal of a decree 
finding defendant guilty of contempt, at page 744 (paragraph t >) 
Justice McCarty, with concurrence of two other justices, not^ 
"The next question raised by this appeal is, did the court err in 
requiring the defendant to pay to the plaintiff $300 as attorney's 
fees as a part of the costs and expenses incurred by him in the 
prosecution of the action? ... It would seem that the Legislature, 
by making use of the word 'expenses', and associating it with that 
of 'costs', intended that something more than the usual or ordinary 
costs that are allowed to a prevailing party in civil actions 
generally might be allowed ... in addition to or in lieu of a fine 
or imprisonment ... we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the 
court proceeded entirely within the statute in allowing plaintiff 
reasonable attorney's fees." 
In Mellor v. Cook, 597 P2.d 882, the case cited by defendant's 
counselor at trial (See July 7 transcript pg39/23-25 and pg40/l-5) 
at [7] "Our conclusion as stated herein renders it unnecessary to 
consider the matter of penalties imposed ... it seems not amiss 
to observe that the penalty for contempt is set out in Sec. 78-32-10 
... but we are aware of no provision authorizing an additional 
penalty of attorney's fees." The award of damages to an aggrieved 
party in a contempt proceeding is covered by Sec. 78-32-11 and that 
as appearing in Pacific Reporter, 2d Series "to pay plaintiff's 
attorney" his feeis the note, Justice Crockett's observation, amiss 
or not, is curious. Be that as it may, the notation of this case in 
the Utah Judicial Code Annotated for Sec* 78-32-10 was apparently 
enough to confuse BULLOCK's counsel as to the appropriateness of 
awarding attorney1s fees in this matter. 
From the July 7, 1992 trial until the August 24, 1993 Notice of 
Filing on this appeal, BULLOCK1s counsel apparently was not yet 
well enough aware with this issue to realize it was not basis for 
an appeal. BULLOCK, now acting pro se as his own counsel, requests 
requests this Court to take judicial notice of this in determining 
the effectiveness and diligence of BULLOCK's counsel at the trial 
court level. 
Authority to award TOYOTA attorney's fees appears appropriate, 
however the court's basis for finding these fees as "reasonable" 
remains an issue in this appeal. 
The court's finding in memorandum decision of "reasonable" 
fees (without contrary evidence presented) was done under the 
auspices of adjudicative notice governed by Rule 201 URE, in that 
a court is recognized, by practice and precedent, to acknowledge 
that which is "generally known within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the trial court." Rule 201 URE(b)(l). However, this adjudicative 
finding requires of the court more than simple acquiescence to the 
hourly rates charged by an attorney submitting his or her fee for 
approval. An attorney's fee is the extension of the hourly rate 
multiplied by the hours of burden. The trial court must therefore 
take both rate and burden into its consideration for a finding that 
fees are reasonable. 
In the current case, because the court based its finding on 
the affidavit submitted by TOYOTA's attorney pursuant to Rule 4-505 
4-505 UCJA, there appears to be, prima facie, reversible error. 
In this matter appearance of error occurs in both TOYOTA1s 
attorney's compliance with Rule 4-505 UCJA and the finding of the 
court as to the "reasonableness" of the attorney's fees using the 
submitted affidavit as basis because: 
(a) The July 7, 1993 affidav-it submitted by Mr. Haslr is 
not in compliance with Rule 4-505(1) UCJA, making no disci ,u e of 
his own hourly rate for six hours of burden claimed in tl - tal. 
(The appellant apologizes to this Court if the "supplemental" 
affidavit referred to in the memorandum decision corrects this 
technical deficiency. At the time of the preparation of this 
brief that supplement was not available in the files of prior 
counsel and court records were not then accessible. This also 
means the additional $377.50 in attorney's fees awarded TOYOTA 
for services performed after July 7, 1993 have not been reviewed 
and are excluded from the following analysis.); and, 
(b) The submitted attorney's fees are an extension of hourly 
rate multiplied by the burden in hours. In the affidavit (prior 
to the June 27, 1993 drunken spree in which BULLOCK talked to 
himself on Mr. Tony Divino's mobile phone's answering machine 
on ten separate occasions for a duration of a minute or less each) 
a total burden of 6.1 hours was spent by Mr. Has lam and Mr. Holt 
preparing the material supporting court issuance of a show cause 
order, upon which the court so did. A total of 5.1 hours was then 
subsequently spent, as a result of the above noted drunken spree, 
with both Mr. Has lam and Mr. Holt reviewing the tape recorded 
messages left by BULLOCK, conversations with an officer named 
Jerry Mendez (who likely has no show cause expertise), review 
of Criminal Code, a telephone conference with an indemnification 
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bureau, and all manner of extraneous activity overburdening 
a "reasonable" effort for a routine show cause hearing. As well, 
Mr. Has lam and Mr. Holt spent four hours on July 7th preparing for 
the July 7, 1993 Show Cause hearing over and above the five hours 
they had spent on July 6, 1993 in preparation for the very same but 
abbreviated July 6, 1993 Show Cause hearing. The burden claimed 
is indeed "burdensome" for the preparation of a routine Show Cause 
Order and accompanying motion and affidavit. 
Lacking disclosure of Mr. HaslanTs hourly rate in the affidavit 
submitted by him pursuant to Rule 4-505 UCJA and by apparently not 
taking burden into its consideration, the court apparently erred 
lacking basis for its finding of "reasonable" attorney's fees. 
Issue 2(b): 
BULLOCK'S counsel at both the July 6 and July 7, 1993 show 
cause hearings, as is evident from the transcripts, made several 
attempts to demonstrate that the court lacked jurisdiction due to 
the insufficiency of service on the defendant (in that an affidavit 
did not accompany the June 26, 1993 Order to Show Cause). However, 
at the July 7, 1993 hearing BULLOCK's counsel critically failed to 
adequately represent defendant when TOYOTAfs council presented to 
the court an Amended Return of Service. BULLOCK's counsel had at 
his disposal, though BULLOCK had not yet reviewed the material, a 
Notice of Continuance delivered to him the night before by TOYOTA's 
attorney purported to contain "all of the pleadings and all of the 
documents in the Court's file." (See the July 7 transcript at 
pgl/21-22). Contained therein was the original Return of Service 
showing only a Show Cause Order being served. The Amended Return 
of Service showed that a Show Cause Order, Motion, and Affidavit 
*.* ,uC piutccuing xo allow development of a strategy for the 
defense, research of points in law, taking of depositions, etc.; 
but BULLOCK's counselor made no objectionto the document's admission. 
After the court admitted the document and queried of TOYOTA 
why there was an Amended Constables Return, TOYOTA's counselo , 
Mr. Haslam, evaded the fact that the Original Return of Ser- e gave 
support to BULLOCK's claim of insufficiency of service and problem 
of jurisdiction for the court. BULLOCK's counselor made . > motion 
to strike. BULLOCK lost the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing 
which would have allowed gaining the time to develop a strategy to 
achieve the legal outcome at the trial court level for those issues 
that are on appeal presently at Bar. Namely, allowance of testimony 
regarding mitigating circumstances and challenge of reasonableness 
of attorney's fees, as well as possibly avoiding three days in jail. 
In Robinson v. City Court for City of Ogden, 185 P.2d 256, [7J 
"The affidavit takes the place of the complaint, and whether the 
contempt be regarded as civil or criminal, when not committed in the 
presence of the court or the judge in his chambers, the court is 
without jurisdiction to proceed until a pleading of some nature has 
been served on the accused and filed with the court." (Emphasis added) 
In Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P2.d 288 at [5,6] " ... There being 
no effective service of process, the court was without jurisdiction 
to enter the original decree of divorce ... Rule 60(b) provides in 
pertinent part as follows ... (4) when, for any cause, the summons 
in an action has not been personally served upon the defendant as 
required by Rule 4(e) ... (5) the judgement is void; ... Even under 
subsection (5) a void judgement seemingly must be challenged within 
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a "reasonable time." But where the judgement is void because of a 
fatally defective service of process, the time limitations ... have 
no application. ... the order denying relief from judgement must 
be, and is, reversed. The case is remanded for entry of judgement 
vacating the decree of divorce because of the ineffective service of 
process." 
In Martin v. Nelson, 533 P.2d 897 at [2.3] "Service of process 
here was defective, not only because of the false return but because 
it required answer in 20 days instead of 30 days. Such service is 
jurisdictional. ... The case is remanded with instruction to vacate 
the judgement and let the parties take it from there." 
CONCLUSION 
With respect to each issue individually: 
1) The trial court's disallowance, on basis of irrelevancy, 
of potentially pertinent testimony and evidence addressing 
mitigation of contemnor's sentence appears to be reversible 
error. 
At minimum, vacating of judgement is required with remand 
to lower court. 
2) The inadequacy of BULLOCK's counsel's performance both 
generally and as to particular points of apparent reversible 
error that adversely affected the outcome of the trial -
though the proximate cause of such inadequacy may have been 
the trial court's disallowance of counselor's request for 
appropriate time to review court files and otherwise prepare 
for trial (notwithstanding the counselor's later performance 
and subsequent withdrawl for reason of disbarment in the case 
at Bar) - denied BULLOCK his right to a fair trial as is 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution entitling defendant to a trial de novo with 
remand to trial court. 
2(a) Deficiencies in the affidavit supporting attorney's 
fees are apparent, particularly with regard to undisclosed 
hourly rate and detail of burden pursuant to Rule 4-505 UC*\ . 
Court's finding of reasonable attorney's fees lacks basis, 
requiring vacating of judgement and remand to court. 
2(b) This court may, from the court record and the two 
conflicting Returns of Service (see addendum), decide to 
to remand to court to determine, in evidentiary hearing, 
which of the documents represents the truth. The papers 
speak for themselves. 
spectfully submitted this day of November, 1993. 
/LfAJU 
John R. Bullock, Pro se 
Defendant/Appellant 
5075 West 4700 South #59 
Kearns, Utah 84118 
ADDENDUM 
1) June 29, 1992 Returns of Service 
a - Original 
b - Amended 
2) Transcripts of trial testimony 
CONSTABLE'S RETUHN 
I, J&H PHELPS / being first drily sworn on oath and say: 
I am a duly appointed Deputy Constable, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the time of service 
herein, and not a part of or interested in the within action* 
I received the within and hereto annexed, 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
on the 26 of JUN , 1992 , and served the same upon BULLOCX, JOHN R* 
( 
a within named defendant in said, ( 
( 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
by serving a true copy of said, 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
for the defendant with JOHH R. BULLOCK (PERSOHALLZ) 
a person of suitable age and discretion there residing at, 
5075 WEST 4700 SOUTH #59 ,SALT LAKE CITY 
his/her usual place of ABODE , on this 29 day of JON ,19 
I further ceritfy that at the time of service of the said, 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
I endorsed the date and place of service and axided my name and official 
title thereto• 
On the 29 day of JUN , 1992 
Deputy Ln. °T Pkdpb- SL 803 
Robert^Reitz Constable, Salt Lake County 
396 Cypress St«, Midvale at, 84047 580-1: 








I, JAN PHELPS , being first duly sworn on oath and say: 
I am a duly appointed Deputy Constable, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the time of service 
srein, and not a part of or interested in the within action. 
I received the within and hereto annexed, 
IDER TO SHOW CAUSE & MOTION & AFFIDAVIT 
MEMORANDUM 
a the 26 of JUN , 1992 , and served the same upon BULLOCK, JOHN R. 
within named defendant in said, 
RDER TO SHOW CAUSE & MOTION & AFFIDAVIT 
MEMORANDUM 
y serving a true copy of said, 
RDER TO SHOW CAUSE & MOTION & AFFIDAVIT 
: MEMORANDUM 
:or the defendant with JOHN R. BULLOCK (PERSONALLY) 
i person of suitable age and discretion there residing at, 
5075 WEST 4700 SOUTH #59 ,SALT LAKE CITY 
lis/her usual place of ABODE , on this 29 day of JUN ,1992 
I further ceritfy that at the time of service of the said, 
3RDER TO SHOW CAUSE & MOTION & AFFIDAVIT 
& MEMORANDUM 
I endorsed the date and place of service and added my name and official 
title thereto. 
On the 29, day of JUN , 1992 
Deputy/** 'rPUf*- SL 803 
Robert Reitz Constable, Salt Lake County 



































IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TOYOTA OF OGDEN, 





) Transcript of 
i HEARING 
) Case No. 92090C 
*VV ^^ ^p- f^*- p^» 
The above-entitled cause of action came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable Anne M. Stirba, 
a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the State 
of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Monday, July 6, 1992, 
at 3:00 p.m. 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
DENNIS V. HASLAM 
Attorney at Law 
175 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
RAY STODDARD 
Attorney at Law 
72 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
MONDAY. JULY 6. 1992 3:00 P.M, 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: All right, let's go on the record 
in the matter of Toyota of Ogden vs. John R. Bullock, 
920900693- Counsel, state your appearances, please. 
MR- HASLAM: Dennis Haslam appearing for the 
plaintiff, Your Honor. 
MR. STODDARD: Ray Stoddard appearing for the 
defendant. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you, counsel. The 
matter comes before the Court pursuant to the plaintiff's 
Order to Show Cause why the defendant should not be held 
in contempt of court. Counsel, you may proceed. 
MR. STODDARD: Your Honor, first I want to 
raise two objections to this proceeding. First, the 
defendant has not received adequate notice under the 
statute. He was served last Monday, which is a four-day 
notice. Rule 16 requires five days' notice. More 
serious, I think, is the fact he has not been served with 
a copy of the affidavit. We don't know what he is 
defending against. 
The Utah case law is very clear. I am citing 
here the Robertson vs. The City of Ogden, 185 P2d 256. 
Very clear that this Court has no jurisdiction until he 
is served with a copy of the affidavit supporting the 
1 
Order to Show Cause. I'm quoting from this case: "The 
affidavit takes the place of the complaint, whether the 
complaint can be regarded as civil or criminal, were not 
committed in the presence of the Court or the Judge in 
his chambers, the Court is without jurisdiction to 
proceed until a pleading of some nature has been served 
upon the accused and filed with the court." 
THE COURT: The pleading of some nature? 
MR. STODDARD: They are talking about in this 
paragraph, about the affidavit. We need to show what he 
is defending against. 
The Rules of 78-32-sub 1 requires that it be 
supported by affidavit. Of course, I think there is a 
purpose. The purpose is that the defendant be served so 
he knows what he defending against. It's in the nature 
of that information. Right now, we are proceeding as if 
the defendant were served with an information saying, 
"You are charged with a crime, come and defend yourself." 
We need to have something more. 
I would also ask the Court to — we also had 
some problems preparing for this matter. I was dust 
retained Thursday. I didn't realize it was a court 
holiday on Friday. We have some problems with the 
preparation. What we are simply asking for is a 
continuance. The defendant will be out of town all next 
2 
week, going back to the Democratic National Convention. 
We will accept service today. We are not trying to 
obstruct. We are simply trying to get in a position 
where we know what is going on. 
THE COURT: Mr. Stoddard, with regard to the 
two issues you have raised, notice and affidavit, at this 
point I would ask Mr. Haslam to respond to those issues. 
I think you are getting beyond, you know, those two 
issues in your comments now. 
MR. STODDARD: I agree I am. I am just saying 
we are not trying to obstruct we just want to get this in 
an orderly fashion. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
MR. HASLAM: Your Honor, I don't believe that 
there is anything in the rules that requires anything to 
be supported by the Order to Show Cause and be served 
upon the opposing party. There is nothing in the rules 
specifically. It is an order from the court to require 
3 
1 the party to appear. 
2 Mr. Bullock was served on the 29th of June. He 
3 has had from that day until this day to call my office 
4 and ask for a copy. He didn't call my office and ask for 
5 a copy. He called my office, though, and spoke to my 
6 secretary about whether or not we were trying to serve 
7 I him. So he had notice of this procedure last Monday. 
8 
9 
THE COURT: Mr. Stoddard, where in the rule do 
you contend you are entitled to receive an affidavit at 
the time you received this Order to Show Cause? 
MR. STODDARD: I think I left the one copy. 
Rule 38-3, 2, 9 or 8. I don't have that right in front 
of me. It requires it be supported by a — the Motion 
for Contempt be supported by affidavit. I don"t think it 
5 
1 actually requires that it be served, but I think Utah 
2 case law does. I think it makes sense. This is in the 
3 nature of a criminal proceeding. 
4 THE COURT: No, it is not. Civil contempt. We 
5 are talking about civil contempt. 
6 MR. STODDARD: Yeah. The Utah Supreme Court 
7 vs. a quasi criminal proceeding. The case I am citing, I 
8 would like to present the Court. I only have one copy of 
9 it. It is yellow, and again I read the Court that 
10 phrasing and it does indicate that the Court has no 
11 jurisdiction to proceed in this matter until the 
12 defendant is served with a copy of the affidavit. 
13 THE COURT: Where does it say that? 
14 MR. STODDARD: It says, "The affidavit takes 
15 the place of a complaint and whether the contempt be 
16 regarded as civil or criminal, but not committed in the 
17 presence of the Court or the Judge in his chambers, the 
18 Court is without jurisdiction to proceed until a pleading 
19 of some nature has been served upon the accused and filed 
20 in the court." There is one sentence. I think that 
21 refers back to what that sentence is talking about which 
22 is the affidavit. 
2 3
 THE COURT: Now 78-32-4 says: MWhen the 
24 contempt is not committed in the immediate view and 
25 presence of the Court or Judge, a Warrant of Attachment 
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affidavit. " 
I think there has to be something telling you 
what he is charged with, other than, "You're in contempt 
of court." It is always helpful for him, "You are in 
contempt of court for some reason." We are supposed to 
come into court and be prepared to defend against it. 
THE COURT: All right, I will tell you what I 
am willing to do here today. Affidavits have been 
submitted today. I think in fairness to Mr. Bullock, he 
is entitled to at least review those and come prepared to 
defend against them, if he chooses to do so. I am 
willing to continue this case for one day to give you an 
opportunity to do that. 
THE COURT: 9:10 tomorrow, can you both make 
that? 
8 
MR. HASLAM: Your Honor, I have some 
depositions scheduled but I will have them delayed. 
THE COURT: Another thing we could do is start 
at 1:00, either time would be agreeable. 
MR. STODDARD: Either time is fine with me. 
MR. HASLAM: 1:00 would be better for me, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: We will reconvene at 1:00 tomorrow 
afternoon. 
THE COURT: Very well. Court is in recess 
until 1:00 tomorrow. 
MR. STODDARD: Could we have a copy of the 
original affidavit which we still don't have it? 
MR. HASLAM: I would be happy to give Mr. 
9 
Stoddard a copy. I believe a copy was attached to the 
Order to Show. 
THE COURT: The original Order to Show doesn't 
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of action came 
CD 
on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable Anne M. Stirba, 
a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the State 
of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Tuesday, July 7, 
1992, at 1:00 p.m. 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
DENNIS V. HASLAM 
Attorney at Law 
175 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
RAY STODDARD 
Attorney at Law 
72 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
1 TUESDAY, JULY 7, 1992 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: Let's go back on the record in the 
4 matter of Toyota of Ogden vs. John R. Bullock. The Court 
5 notes the presence of counsel for both parties, as well 
6 as Mr. Bullock. Mr. Haslam, you may proceed. 
7 MR. STODDARD: Your Honor, just for the record, 
8 I would like to renew my motion. The Court lacks 
9 jurisdiction. For lack of jurisdiction. Just for the 
10 record, I would note that the Court indicated last night 
11 at the close of the hearing that no affidavit was in the 
12 file, which means that no affidavit was there when the 
13 order was issued, which would mean an order was issued 
14 without jurisdiction. That is formality. I wanted to 
15 simply put myself on record. 
16 MR. HASLAM: May I address that question 
17 immediately, Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Yes. 
19 MR. HASLAM: I would like to present to the 
20 Court a Notice of Continuance that I delivered to Mr. 
21 Stoddard last night that essentially contains all of the 
22 pleadings and all of the documents in the Court's file. 
23 I would also like to present to the Court a copy of 
24 Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. I have 
25 highlighted subsection (d), Your Honor. I wish to 
1 correct myself in indicating to the Court that I was not 
2 aware of a rule requiring service of an affidavit with an 
3 Order to Show Cause. Rule 6 clearly requires that 
4 certain Orders to Show Cause be accompanied by an 
5 affidavit. 
6 I would also like to present to the Court an 
7 original Constable's Amended Return of Service which 
8 indicates that the defendant was served with an Order to 
9 Show Cause and Motion and Affidavit and Memorandum. 
10 I would also like to present to the Court a 
11 copy of a case entitled Jenson vs. Eames in which the 
12 Utah Supreme Court indicates that in a contempt 
13 proceeding — or excuse me, in an Order to Show Cause 
14 proceedings referencing service of an Order to Show Cause 
15 that the five-day provision that appears in Rule 6 is not 
16 a hard and fast rule and the Court has some discretion to 









THE COURT: All right. Why is there an Amended 
Constable's Return? 
MR. HASLAM: Because the issue was raised 
yesterday, Your Honor, about whether or not he had 
received a copy of the affidavit with the Order to Show 
Cause and I went back to the Constable's office yesterday 
to verify what had been served. I would also point out 
to the Court that Mr. Stoddard indicated to me yesterday 
before we began that his client learned that I had tapes 
of the alleged conversations. There is only one way that 
he could have learned that there were any tapes of the 
alleged conversations because they are referenced in the 
affidavit that we submitted in support of the Order to 
Show Cause. The other reference to tapes, Your Honor, 
was not presented to the Court until we got here 
yesterday when I furnished copies of those affidavits to 
him that referenced other tape recordings. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Haslam. 
MR. STODDARD: Judge, briefly. First, we 
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learned of the tapes because they have a tape recorder 
here. It is a fairly safe deduction: you don't bring a 
tape recorder to the court without tapes. That is the 
basis for that statement by Mr. Bullock. He came out and 
said, "They must have tapes because they have a tape 
machine here." That is all. 
The basis for my motion is it is very clear 
from the Court's own statement, and I have not actually 
seen the file, that there is no affidavit in the file. 
The case I cited before, Robinson vs. City Court and — 
THE COURT: There is an affidavit of Tony 
Divino filed June 26, 1992. Is that the affidavit which 
you are referring? 
MR. HASLAM: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. STODDARD: You indicated last night you 
could not find one. 
THE COURT: I had not looked in the file. I 
didn't say it wasn't in here. I dust hadn't looked in 
the file. 
MR. STODDARD: The strongest basis for the 
motion was that the affidavit was not in the file. I 
would renew the motion I made yesterday. You have 
already decided against me, but I am simply at this point 
doing it as a formality in this hearing. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Stoddard 
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and Mr. Haslam. I am satisfied that the Court has 
jurisdiction in this case based upon the Amended 
Constable's Return, also the case law that has been 
submitted. As to the time at which this matter may be 
heard, I think that this matter could be heard within a 
short time period or otherwise ordinarily prescribed by 
Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
MR. HASLAM: Your Honor, I would like to 
present to the Court a copy of a case entitled "Coleman 
vs. Coleman," decided by the Utah Supreme Court in 1983 
and an opinion written by — a per curiam opinion in 
which the court outlines the basis upon which a finding 
of contempt and imposition of jail sanctions can be 
handled by the court. 
In this case, Your Honor, the court holds that 
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once an affidavit is presented to the court and an Order 
to Show Cause is issued by the court, then the burden of 
proof shifts to the defendant. So it is his obligation 
to go forward at this time. The standard for the court, 
as indicated in the Coleman case, is that a finding of 
contempt and imposition of jail sentence must be 
supported by clear and convincing proof that, one, the 
defendant knew what was required by the previous court 
order. Two, that he had the ability to comply with the 
court order, and three, that he willfully and knowingly 
failed and refused to do so. 
Based upon the entire court file, and all of 
the evidence presented and before the court at the time 
the Order to Show Cause was issued, I believe that we 
have carried our preliminary burden of establishing that 
the defendant has violated this court's order and should 
be found in contempt. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Haslam. Mr. 
Stoddard. 
MR. STODDARD: I still think it is their burden 
to go forward with testimony, but certain affidavits, Mr. 
Divino's affidavit, I think is valid since he is in court 
to support it. The other three affidavits I would move 
to strike. They basically don't say very much except 
that he telephoned. He made threats without identifying 
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1 what the threats were, what he said, any details. But I 
2 would accept Mr. Divino's affidavit provided he also 
3 testifies. But I don't think this court can simply go 
4 forward on the basis of affidavits and shift the burden 
5 to the defendant. 
6 THE COURT: All right. By way of a procedural 
7 approach here, in every contempt hearing which I have 
8 been involved, although I think Mr. Haslam has stated the 
9 law correctly, nevertheless the party seeking the 
10 contempt order goes forward with testimony and presents 
11 the testimony. So I would at this time advise you, Mr. 
12 Haslam, if you wish to call your witness, you may do so. 
13 MR. HASLAM: I will do so, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: And I will reserve with regard to 
15 the affidavits, 
16 MR. STODDARD: One preliminary matter, as I 
17 understand, the tapes will be introduced. I think some 
18 formalities are involved. If we want tapes in, I would 
19 certainly ask the Court to either be liberal with both 
20 parties or strict with both parties on the foundation 
21 departments. 
22 THE COURT: Let's deal with that as it arises. 




Called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, after 
having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified 
as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HASLAM: 
Q Please state your full name and address, sir. 
A Tony Divino, 8490 South Sun Valley Drive; 
Sandy, Utah. 
Q What is your occupation, sir? 
A I am the owner of Toyota of Ogden car 
dealership. It is actually on Riverdale Road in 
Riverdale, Utah. 
Q And what is the business of Toyota of Ogden? 
A Retailing new and used automobiles and parts 
and service. 
Q Do you have an employee there by the name of 
Sue Bullock? 
A Yes, we do. 
Q Do you know what her responsibilities are? 
A She is a sales person for the new and used car 
sales department. 
Q Do you know who her husband is? 
A John Bullock is, was, I am not sure where they 
are at right now. 
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MR. HASLAM: Your Honor, I have in the 
courtroom what I would present to the Court as tape 
recordings of the messages that were left on Mr. Divino's 
answering machine. The evidence is in in the form of Mr. 
Divino's affidavit, but I think it would be helpful to 
the Court to listen to the telephone messages. If I may 
proceed. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
Q (By Mr. Haslam) Mr. Divino, can you describe 
for the Court what kind of message service you have on 
your mobile phone. 
A It is voice mail. If I am not available, if 
the phone is shut off, or if I happen to be on the phone, 
either way it will record a message from anyone that 
wishes to leave one. 
Q And what does the caller do to get to your 
voice mail? 
A They just call my regular number and it 
basically says, "If you stay on the line, you can leave a 
16 
1 message." 
2 Q And were messages left? 
3 A Yes, several. I had 12 the night in question 
4 from Mr. Bullock. 
5 Q Is there a method to retrieve the voice mail 
6 messages? 
7 A Yes. I have to dial again the same phone 
8 number and then I have to put in a code that only I know 
9 and that gets me to my messages. And then it just asks 
10 you if you want to listen to them or not, which I did. 
11 MR. HASLAM: Your Honor, I would like at this 
12 time to turn on the tape. 
13 THE COURT: Very well. 
14 (Tape was played for the Court.) 
15 MR. HASLAM: Your Honor, I don't have any 
16 further evidence to present at this time except in 
17 connection with my client's claim for award of attorney's 
18 fees for the cost of being involved in this mess. 
19 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Haslam. Mr. 
20 Stoddard, do you wish to cross? 
21 MR. STODDARD: I have a few questions. 
22 CROSS EXAMINATION 




Q Can you point specifically to a threat to your 
person? 
A "This is war. Your fucking little balls are 
going to pay." Now, I think that is a threat to me 
physically. 
Q Did he call you before concerning legal cases, 
and said, MThis is war," had he not? 
A Once before in March. 
Q Concerning legal case? 
A No, just called me. 
Q He said, "This is warM? 
A MThis is war." 
Q And you were involved in a legal dispute with 
him? 
A I am not involved in any dispute with him. I 
have a Restraining Order against him. 
Q Toyota of Ogden does. 
A They have a Restraining Order against him. 
Q So you are involved with a legal dispute? 
A If that is what you wish to call it, yes. 
Q Now, you referred to — I tried to straighten 
you out. Did he give you warnings about what he felt 
some of your employees were doing? 
A Yes, he — 
MR. HASLAM: Your Honor, I will object to that 
question. I don't think it is relevant to this 
proceeding. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. STODDARD: I think it is because I think it 
explains some of the background of what has happened 
here. 
THE COURT: Ask your next question, counselor. 
Q (By Mr. Stoddard) When did you listen to these 
tapes, at night or the next day? 
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THE COURT: You may step down. You wish to 
make a proffer as to your attorney's fees at this time? 
MR. HASLAM: Your Honor, I have an affidavit to 
present to the Court. I am delivering one to Mr. 
Stoddard and the original to the Court. I believe that 
it complies with Rule 4-405 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration, Your Honor. I would be willing to take 
the stand if there are any questions regarding my bill. 
THE COURT: Mr. Stoddard, would you prefer that 
20 
1 Mr. Haslam take the stand? 
2 MR. STODDARD: No, I will challenge him at the 
3 proper time, but I don't think he is entitled to 
4 attorney's fees under the laws. 
5 THE COURT: Well, this is a proffer as to what 
6 the attorney's fees would be if the Court finds they 
7 should be awarded in this case. 
8 MR. STODDARD: I may — I would like to look at 
9 it. I haven't had a chance to review it. 
10 THE COURT: You reserve on that? 
11 MR. STODDARD: I will reserve on that. 
12 THE COURT: All right, we will allow that to be 
13 reopened if necessary. All right, do you have any 
14 I witnesses, Mr. Stoddard? 
15 MR. STODDARD: I will call Mr. Bullock. 
16 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Bullock, step 
17 forward. 
18 JOHN ROBERT BUT.T.OCK 
19 Called as a witness on his own behalf, after having been 
20 first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
21 DIRECT EXAMINATION 


















14 I Q Now, but you were aware you were not supposed 
15 to call the dealer Toyota? 
16 A Yes, I was. 
17 Q At least the other people other than your wife? 
18 A Yes, I was. 
19 Q Now, going back to Saturday the 27th, did you 
20 call your wife at Toyota? 
21 A I made my first attempt to reach my wife at 
22 5:00. 
23 Q And why did you attempt to call her? 
24 A She had called and left a message the day 
25 | before telling me that she would return the call. Susan 
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and I had talked off and on quite often at her job and 
she did not return the call. There was a pressing matter 
with regard to getting our divorce complete. There was 
also the matter that there had been attempted on Thursday 
a delivery of the Order to Show Cause. I confirmed on 
Friday that that Order had been attempted to be 
delivered. I was not certain it was Toyota of Ogden 
doing this until I called Winder and Haslam and made 
confirmation they were attempting to deliver this Order 
and I gave them the proper address. 
Q When did you do that? 
A I did that on Friday. 
Q Now — 
A Excuse me, that was done on Monday. The 
Monday. The proper address was done on Monday. 
Q Now on Saturday, did you try to call your wife 
again? 
A Yes. There were probably two or three 
occasions between 5 and 7:30 where I attempted to reach 
her and was told she was at the dental. 
Q Did you keep calling? 
A After the third occasion at about 7:30, someone 
had answered with the — I was not certain of the name. 
Now I have seen some of the affidavits. I believe I know 
what it was. It is three names. It is something-
23 
something-something the third. At that time he told me 
that — I guess my voice had been identified. They 
realized I was trying to reach Susan. He told me he was 
going to have me suck his cock. 
MR. HASLAM: Object, Your Honor, this doesn't 
have anything to do with whether or not he violated the 
Restraining Order. 
MR. STODDARD: I think it does. I think the 
Court is going to have to hear this. We are essentially 
going to admit that they violated the Restraining Order, 
but we would urge the Court there are mitigating 
circumstances. 
THE COURT: I really don't see that this is 
particularly relevant to this contempt hearing, besides 
of what this other person might have said to him, I 
believe is hearsay. So, I will sustain the objection. 
MR. STODDARD: We are not going to the truth of 
the matter, simply that these things were said. 
THE COURT: He can testify to what he did in 
response to what he was informed of, but it is hearsay as 
to what this other person said to him, I believe. So I 
am sustaining the objection. Ask your next question. 
MR. STODDARD: Well, are you ruling we should 
not at this point go into mitigating circumstances or 




























THE COURT: I sustained the objection to that 
MR. STODDARD:' I understand that, Your Honor. 
What I am intending to pursue here is not so much that he 
did not do it, but the mitigating circumstances that are 
involved. 
THE COURT: What is relevant here is whether he 
knew the Order, whether he knew what was required by the 
previous Court Order, whether he had the ability to 
comply with it, and whether he failed and refused to 
comply with it. Those are the issues that are relevant 
to this proceeding. So ask your questions accordingly. 
Q (By Mr. Stoddard) Now did the person say 
something that upset you? 
A Yes. 
Q How much did it upset you? 
A I had been between 5:00 and 7:30, I had been 
drinking substantially. When that happens, I respond in 
kind, if you will. I think that is reflected by the 
messages I left for Mr. Tony Divino. 
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Q (By Mr. Stoddard) Now, in the past when you 
called up there, had you been goated by people up there? 
A I have been on calling them not only goated by 
people up there, but I have received phone calls at my 
home — 
MR. HASLAM: Your Honor, he is in violation and 
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I object to testimony along this line. 
THE COURT: I will permit this answer. Go 
ahead. 
THE WITNESS: I have when calling up there, and 
being recognized by individuals, been goated, as you say, 
been insulted, been told my wife is doing things. I have 
also had phone calls at my home shortly after those 
incidents which gave me cause to believe that there is an 
attempt to cause me to react. 
Q (By Mr. Stoddard) Has your life ever been 
threatened? 
A Yes, it has. 
Q In what terms? 
MR. HASLAM: Your Honor, I will object to the 
line of questioning. 
THE COURT: All right, I am going to sustain 
that objection. I don't think this is relevant to this 
proceeding. Mr. Stoddard, the question is whether he 
willfully and knowingly failed and refused to comply with 
the Court Order, and mitigation I don't see is a 
particular issue. And I am not going to debate the point 
with you. I have sustained the objection. 
MR. STODDARD: I would like to make one further 
point. I think it is important in this type of hearing 
as to whether the plaintiffs themselves have clean hands. 
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1 A It is quite obvious. I was aware of the 
2 Court's Order. I did not want to violate the Court's 
3 Order. But when told that my wife is in the back room 
4 sucking someone's cock, when I am drinking I am going to 
5 respond. 
6 Q And why did you call Mr. Divino? 
7 A Because he is the chief executive officer, 
8 because my first initial attempt to explain what was 
9 going on there, described in my January 30th letter, put 
10 the burden on him to straighten up the mess that is up 
11 there. 
12 MR. HASLAM: Move to strike the answer as being 
13 non-responsive. He is testifying about stuff that 
14 doesn't matter here, Your Honor. This is totally 
15 irrelevant. 
16 THE COURT: I am going to let the answer stand. 
17 However, I am not interested in generalizations here, Mr. 









Q Now there is talk in the affidavits about a 
summons, a threat that you received. I believe it is the 
first time you called or mentioned a summons. In the 
first phone call you made, I understand you are 
unintelligible about a summons. 
A Correct. 
Q Were you aware that someone was trying to serve 
you with a summons? 
A Yes, there had been an attempt to serve me at 
my brother"s residence at 52 West 7200 South, and through 
my family I learned that someone was attempting to serve 
me. I had to — I assumed it was Toyota of Ogden because 
this is the only trouble I have. 
Q And as you have already testified, you called 
to make arrangements to be served with that summons on 
Monday? 
A Yes. 
Q Instead of hiding out. 
A (No audible response.) 
Q Was that one of the reasons you were calling 
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1 your wife? 
2 A Yes, I was trying to confirm, one, did she know 
3 anything about the summons, the Order to Show Cause it 
4 should be called, I guess, being served and I also had a 
5 recording from her indicating that she had something that 
6 she wanted to speak to me about. 
7 MR. STODDARD: Anyway, I have no further 
8 questions at this point. 
9 THE COURT: All right. Any cross? 
10 MR. HASLAM: Briefly, Your Honor. 
11 CROSS EXAMINATION 















Q And does the Order in the Court's file indicate 
that a copy of the Court's Order was mailed to you at 50 
West 7200 South? 
A I discovered that this morning. 
Q You are telling the Court today that you didn't 
get it? 
A I never received it. 
Q Can you tell the Court what the premises are at 
50 West 7200 South? 
A They are apartments, a boxing gym and my 
parents' home. 
Q A boxing gym? 
A Yes. 
Q What goes on in a boxing gym. 
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A We are coaches of amateur fighting. 
MR. STODDARD: What goes on in a boxing gym is 
irrelevant. He is simply stating the truth. He did not 
actually receive the Order. 
MR. HASLAM: I think it is very relevant to the 
question of what this Court is going to do with this man 
to prevent him from doing it again. 
MR. STODDARD: He has admitted he knew about 
the Order. He didn't receive a copy of it. 
THE COURT: I really don't see the significance 
of a boxing gym at this particular address. 
MR. HASLAM: I have no further questions. 
THE COURT: Any redirect? 
MR. STODDARD: I have no further questions. 
THE COURT: You have any other witnesses, Mr. 
Stoddard? 
MR. STODDARD: No. 
THE COURT: Any rebuttal? 
MR. HASLAM: I have no rebuttal, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. Counsel, you may argue 
it. 
MR. HASLAM: Your Honor, the contempt was filed 
February 6, 1992, a TRO was issued the same day to 
prevent him from contacting the people at Toyota of 
Ogden. The scope of the Order includes employees on the 
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premises and employees off the premises. Mr. Divino 
clearly falls within the scope. 
The first affidavit we filed with the court on 
behalf of Mr. Divino on June 26th contains two messages. 
He continued to receive messages after that time, ten 
calls on June 27th. It is un-rebutted before this court 
that Mr. Divino testified that his dealership had 
received hundreds of telephone calls from Mr. Bullock. 
We have before the Court affidavits and Mr. Divino's 
testimony with 29 clear, un-rebutted violations of the 
Court's Order. 
Under Utah Code Annotated, section 78-31-1, I 
believe the Court has to find him in contempt of this 
Court's Order. Under section 10 of Chapter 32, the Court 
can fine him $200 per violation. The Court can order him 
to jail up to 30 days per violation. Under section 78-
32-11, the Court is entitled to make an award of costs 
and expenses or losses that a party may suffer as a 
result of the violation of the Court's Order. 
The law in the State of Utah, as I understand 
it, Your Honor, with respect to criminal violations is 
that intoxication is not a defense to a criminal case. 
This is a civil contempt matter and the plaintiff, for 
our burden of proof, if that is what it is, does not 



















18 I MR. STODDARD: Your Honor, first let me read 
19 some of the details. He alleges, I think, 29 separate 
20 violations. 
21 THE COURT: I am going to look at just the ten. 





I think the defendant has been subjected to 
harassment. He did himself record two messages that took 
place after this, but I think they indicate what the kind 
of abuse he has been subjected to and I will ask at this 
point the Court want to hear testimony in mitigation of 
what has happened and what he has been subjected to? I 
think it is relevant at this point. This is essentially 
the sentence. I think it would be relevant to hear some 
testimony as to what he has been subjected to and the 
mitigating circumstances of what he did. 
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THE COURT: I have ruled on that issue. 
MR. STODDARD: Okay, I can understand that is 
part of the trial itself, but I think there should be 
some mitigation too so the Court will understand why he 
did what he did. Again, the sentencing is for leeway, if 
there is one. And we are not contesting the actual 
contempt. We feel that he did violate the Court Order. 
He is admitting that. But we feel the Court should 
listen to some mitigating circumstances as to why he did 
it. It wasn't just unprovoked incidents out of the blue 
calls to Divino. 
THE COURT: In all due respect, Mr. Stoddard, I 
don't think mitigating circumstances are relevant to this 
kind of proceeding. There is a Court Order in place and 
the only issues are whether he knew of the Court Order, 
whether he had the ability to comply with it, whether he 
reasonably and knowingly failed to or refused to comply 
with it. And those are the relevant issues and I don't 
think mitigation is relevant. I have already ruled on 
that. 
MR. STODDARD: But I do think the Court has a 
choice of how he found out about it. The Court, 
hopefully, may feel that he is less — may treat him less 
harshly if he was goated than if he were to do it clear 










just knew he 
dispute. 
THE 
do that, Mr. 
MR. 
COURT: Well, if he hadn 
there wouldn't have been 
't called in the 
any allegation of 
STODDARD: That may be true. But 
was doing here, with all 
called his wife to try to 
COURT: Now, he knew he 
Stoddard. 
STODDARD: In the first 
I just 
of his trouble, I 
settle a domestic 
wasn't supposed to 
place, he was 
returning her phone calls. 
THE COURT: It doesn't matter, Mr. Stoddard, 
under the Court Order. 
MR. STODDARD: 
As to attorney's fees, I do have a lack of 
preparation time. I can cite in the annotations to 78-
32-10, under attorney's fees it says, "There is no 
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provisions for additional penalty of attorney's fees for 
a contempt." Miller vs. Coke, 597 Pac2d 882. I did not 
have time to read that case. I would like, before the 
Court decides on the attorney's fees, I would like an 
opportunity to read that. 
THE COURT: Do you have any objections to the 
reasonableness of the attorney's fees presented in the 
affidavit? 
MR. STODDARD: I have not really had a chance 
to go over it. I will reserve that. I think that would 
also depend somewhat on how the Court rules or whether he 
is entitled to attorney's fees at all. I know on that 
one case, at least the way it sounds, would suggest he is 
not entitled to any attorney's fees whatsoever. 
The statute does say he is entitled to cost. 
So if there are costs involved, I think there would be 
actual out-of-pocket cost, I think he would be entitled 
to those under the statute. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. 
Stoddard. Anything else, Mr. Haslam? 
MR. HASLAM: Your Honor, again, I believe that 
the case I presented to the Court of Coleman vs. Coleman 
is what should guide the Court today. It is clear that 
he knew the Court Order existed. It is clear that he was 
aware of its terms. It is clear that he had the ability 
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to comply by simply not picking up the telephone, and it 
is clear that he did this knowingly. He admitted on the 
witness stand, and he admitted pn the tape recordings 
that he knew he was violating the Court Order. 
In connection with the question of attorney's 
fees, Your Honor, section 11 specifically provides, "If 
an actual loss or injury to a party in an action or 
special proceedings prejudicial to his rights therein is 
caused by the contempt, the Court in addition to the fine 
or imprisonment imposed for the contempt in place 
thereof, may order the person proceeded against pay the 
aggrieved party a sum of money sufficient to indemnify 
him and to satisfy his costs and his expenses, which 
order and the acceptance of money under this is a bar to 
an action by the aggrieved party for such loss and 
injury.M 
Your Honor, we have not filed a claim for any 
kind of intentional tort which is available to us. Mr. 
Divino and Toyota of Ogden simply want this to stop today 
and be indemnified for the losses they have suffered. 
That is all I have. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. Based upon 
the testimony that has been presented to the Court and 
the Court having considered the argument of counsel, I 
hereby enter the following finding with regard to the 
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